# Ναυτιλιακά Θέματα - Shipping Subjects > Shipping Forum > ISM Code >  ISM-ISPS-ISO AUDITS

## Petros

*Aims / Targets for the Conduct of Audits*


- Collection of real elements (objective evidence) for the purpose of decision making / evaluation of compliance. 

- Evaluation of performance based on facts

- Identification of risk level

- Determination of elements for improvement

- Improvement of communication and mobilization

- Tracking of training needs

- Evaluation of adequacy / effectiveness / efficiency of the system (ISM,ISPS,ISO)

- Tracking of deficiencies / weaknesses for the implementation of corrective actions

- Certification

Source: Auditing Traing Course by DNV

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## Leo

*Source: BIMCO* It was said, when the International Safety Management Code arrived in the shipping industry more than ten years ago, that its aim was to change the whole “culture” of the industry to one that was safety-oriented. Has this aim been successful? If it has, why would a prominent ship manager, writing in the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch Safety Digest, suggest that shipping still compares unfavourably with the oil and gas industry at sea and ashore, where “people were familiar with Health, Safety and Environmental guidance and in general made efforts to put in place systems that were designed to manage risk and prevent accidents”? 
But the marine world – that of the traditional shipping sector – still tends, he said “to be characterised by ΅machoΆ can-do attitudes, and the belief that accidents are inevitable and simply part of getting the job done....” Is this fair? 

When the ISM Code came into being, a frequently offered comment was that oneΆs attitude to this really quite significant regulatory change would depend upon which of three categories oneΆs company belonged. There was the “Rolls-Royce” component of the industries – those companies which radiated excellence and who would have to make just a few largely administrative changes to implement ISM properly. Then, at the other end of the spectrum, there was a small but significant segment of the industry that would resist any change and improvement because they had always done things with great reluctance. They would be forced into compliance, but do the very minimum to comply. 

Then there was the broad swath between these two “extremes” of people who would not resist, but would comply, because they had no other choice as the regulations prescribed their compliance. The real struggle, it was suggested, was to change the culture within this group to a more positive mindset so they became willing, rather than grudging, participants in this process of change and improvement. 

Any cultural change requires those involved to enjoy some degree of ownership in the process rather than having it dumped upon them by others. It became rapidly obvious that a Safety Management System in which those aboard ship had participated in the design was infinitely better than one in which the owner had merely bought a system “off the shelf” and told the crews to get on with its adoption. There were good and positive reports (usually, it has to be said, from those companies in the first category), of systems which were working smoothly, with statistical evidence backing up the reports of reduced accidents and greater efficiencies. 

There were complaints from all sides about the “bureaucracy” of ISM, in the plethora of manuals that some systems required, the paperwork involved in their maintenance and the reporting of non-compliances. Once again, it has been those companies which would describe themselves as “blue chip” which recognised the problems and moved to adapt and improve their systems to reduce the burden on the users. 

But with the passage of time and the imminence of a revision of the ISM Code, critical voices have been raised once again. There are still poor management systems about that fail to connect with the crews who have to use them. The “compliance culture” still remains in some parts of the industry, and the “safety culture” has, in these areas, yet to emerge. 

Accident reports all too often demonstrate a failure of compliance with the shipΆs own system through all the same attitudes that the ISM Code was designed to counter; complacency, short cuts, laziness, simple refusal to follow procedures, ignorance or incompetence. Is this a failure of the ISM Code itself? Or a failure to put it into practice? 

*Articles written by the Watchkeeper and other outside contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of BIMCO.*

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## Leo

*ISM Code Amendments – 1 July 2010*

A reminder about the changes to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code that enters into force 1 July 2010 by IMO Resolution MSC.273(85) and members are also urged to ensure that these amendments are reflected in the Company and Ship Safety Management Systems. 
Summary of the above mentioned changes to the ISM Code:
·                        Paragraph 1.1.10 - The definition of a major non-conformity makes it clear that this can be either a lack of effective and systematic implementation of a requirement of this Code or an identifiable deviation that poses a serious threat to the safety of personnel or the ship or a serious risk to the environment that requires immediate corrective action. 
·                        Paragraph 1.2.2. - The objectives explicitly require assessment of all identified risks to the Company’s ships, personnel and the environment; the requirement to establish appropriate safeguards remains. 
·                        Paragraph 5.1.5. - The Master’s responsibility to review the Safety Management System (SMS) and report its deficiencies to the shore based management have to be periodic. 
·                        Paragraph 7 - The requirement to establish procedures for key shipboard operations is rephrased to concern the safety of the ship and protection of the environment and now also includes the safety of personnel. 
·                        Paragraph 9.2 - The requirement for implementation of corrective action includes measures intended to prevent recurrence. 
·                        Paragraph 12.1 - Internal safety audits are required to be carried out on board and ashore at intervals not exceeding twelve months; can in exceptional circumstances be exceeded by three months. 
·                        Paragraph 12.2 - The Company evaluation of the safety management system is required to address the effectiveness of the system. 
·                        Paragraph 13 - New paragraphs introduced to bring International Safety Management Certificates into line with the provisions in SOLAS relating to the extension of statutory certificates. 
·                        Paragraph 14.4.3 - Clearly states it is an internal audit which must be held within three months of the interim audit. 
·                        Paragraphs 8.1 and 10.3 – only editorial changes. 

Please find below links to the agreed wording of the IMO Resolution MSC.273(85) and a simple guide on how to implement the changes to the Safety Management Systems.
References:
IMO Resolution MSC.273(85) 
Simple guide on how to implement the changes to the Safety Management Systems

*Source: BIMCO*

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## Natsios

Paragraph 1.2.2 regarding risk assesment and risk management involves once again great paperwork and gives good grounds for PSC deficiencies. In other words, every job/operation etc on board should be first evaluated/assesed in respect of risk involved and a risk management to follow for preventing accidents and/or reducing frequency of accidents etc. 
Now imagine following. An ordinary 1 day call in a port involves mooring/unmooring operations, gear handling operations, opening/closing of hatches, possible bunkering, possible supply with spares/provisions, techintians' attendances, lubs supply, holds preparation, cargo operations, etc etc etc. How many risks in each operation involved?  Shall the Master prepare risk assesment for everypossible small risk involved?

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