# Ναυτιλιακά Θέματα - Shipping Subjects > Shipping Forum > ISM Code >  Safety Bulletins

## Petros

Chevron Shipping Company LLC Safety Bulletin June 07

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## Petros

Reading through the above bulletin once again, I think that I should point out the following in order to avoid any confusions:

The specific bulletin may have some applications in the shipping industry and the safety equipment in general, but it is primarily company specific and most important *equipment specific.* Many different types and brands of safety equipment are used by the industry worldwide with different characteristics.

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## Petros

Source:INTERNATIONAL MARINE TRANSPORTATION

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## stw77

An option, as this were generated and presented by IMO.
======

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## saltwater

Another one from BP 

*!Please note the attached document contains a graphic image of a severe injury!*

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## Petros

Apart from informatinon sharing, this thread was created in order to have the members' comments and exchange of ideas. Especially those who work on board ships and their safety depends on many negative factors which can be controlled or at least limited.

I found the above report comprehensive and really useful, as it states specific and feasible improvement suggestions. 

The accident unfortunately occurred, but actions for prevention of future similar accidents must be implemented.

I keep 6 words (without being an accident analyst): Supervision, Communication, Specialization (work duties), P.P.E (Personal Protective Equipment), Commercial Pressure and Training. (Ok I know the words are more than 6...).

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## Petros

Possible hurrincane off the west coast of the Florida Peninsula.

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## Petros

Chevron Shipping Company LLC Safety Bulletin October 07

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## Leo

*Marine Notice 9/2008*

The maritime industry is well aware of the number of incidents occurring world wide regarding lifeboat release arrangements. At PSC inspections in Australia, there have been 30 ships detained in 2007 for defective lifeboat release arrangements (see http://www.amsa.gov.au/Shipping_Safety/Port_State_Control/Ship_Detention/). This trend appears to be continuing into 2008.
Predominately, the detentions relate to defective maintenance of the equipment. This equipment is often designed in such a way that clearances and the proper maintenance to these lifeboats is absolutely critical. 
AMSA has instructed it's surveyors that they should not rely solely on the boat harbour pins and gripes as being sufficient for an AMSA surveyor to enter a lifeboat, unless it can be demonstrated to the AMSA surveyor that lifeboat release arrangements are correctly set. If unable to be demonstrated, additional restraints will be required to be fitted.
The AMSA surveyor will discuss this with the master early in a PSC or FSC inspection to avoid unnecessary delays. It is the master's responsibility to determine the supplementary restraint arrangement, NOT the AMSA surveyor's; however, the AMSA surveyor must be satisfied with the method used.
This requirement is for entry into the lifeboat when fully housed ONLY. The arrangement is to be removed immediately upon completion of the lifeboat inspection and under NO circumstances is the lifeboat to be swung out with the supplementary restraint fitted.
This requirement is a control mechanism AMSA has implemented to reduce the AMSA surveyor's exposure to risk.
AMSA notes the amount of work being undertaken at the IMO in regard to measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats and will continue to actively participate in the process of improving the level of safety onboard in general and specifically toward lifeboat arrangements.

Graham Peachey
Chief Executive Officer
17 March 2008
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

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## Leo

Πηγή: BIMCO - Watchkeeper

14.05.08 

When the International Maritime Safety (ISM) Code was first implemented, a strong message which was seen as part of this important change was that the Code would alter attitudes toward safety. In short, the Code and its implementation would promote a “safety culture”. 

A useful assessment of the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code in delivering this “culture” in the UK fleet has recently been undertaken by the Maritime & Coastguard Agency, which contracted the ISM expert Dr. Philip Anderson to undertake the work. There were four aims of this study; to assess improvements to safety and safety culture since 1998, to compare the UK fleet with other Paris MoU “white list” countries from 1998 to 2006, to investigate other quality management systems such as Tanker Management and Self Assessment, and to make recommendations for improvement to the Code and its guidelines. 

Although the study, which involved professional researchers, was confined to the UK fleet, it is thought to be one of the most wide-ranging to date. It involved ship operators, insurers, external observers and seafarers. The report, which was announced to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee this week, is broadly encouraging, with a good deal of positive comment, and a majority firmly believing that the ISM Code had improved safety at sea. And while it was admitted that the cost of insurance claims had greatly increased, “there was a consensus of opinion that the shipping industry was a much safer and more environment-friendly industry than it was 10 years ago”. 

Interestingly, it was found that while the ISM Code had made a significant contribution, it could not be isolated from other programmes designed to improve safety and efficiency. Vetting by oil majors, condition surveys by P&I clubs and intensified inspections by Port State Control will also have contributed to the general uplift of standards. 

There were, as expected, complaints about the level of paperwork which the Code generated, but the survey, which took place between October 2007 and January 2008, implied that this was not such a problem as indicated by earlier studies. The greater use of electronic management systems for SMS, and some companies putting additional crew aboard “supported the effective implementation of the system on board”. 

The report indicated that there were problems with external auditors putting different interpretations on the effectiveness of an SMS, with a lack of clear guidance sowing doubts in the minds of those operating the system. A potential danger identified by the survey is that as a result of this doubt, “prescriptive rules and regulations will be produced in response”. This would be a backward step, with the Code losing its non-prescriptive status. What was needed, it seemed to be agreed, was a universal interpretation of the requirements of the existing Code, rather than to make any significant amendments. 

Another significant finding was the complaint that external auditors only fed back deficiencies and non-conformities where these were found, and failed to praise SMSs that were working well, or where good practice was found on board ship. If the only response is to complain, it is clearly disheartening for those who are trying hard to make a system work. 

The recommendations which emerged from the study included the need for a more universal approach to SMSs by external auditors, more education and training, better feedback from systems in other high-risk industries, the development of “a safety culture self assessment inspection toolkit, and possibly developing TMSA to non-tankers. 

It was also suggested that a system should be devised which would encourage feedback on the effectiveness of the Code from seafarers, and other stakeholders. 

*Articles written by the Watchkeeper and other outside contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of BIMCO.*

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## xara

In Case of Fire...

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## Παναγιώτης

The revised SOLAS regulation III/32 (as amended by resolution MSC.152(78)) requires to carry immersion suits for all persons on board cargo ships, regardless of carriage of totally enclosed lifeboats, stemming from  reports  of  casualties  in  which the  ship  sank  too  quickly  for  crew  to  access  the  lifeboats.  Immersion suits were required in order to ensure that thermal protection is available in the event that members of the crew are unable, for whatever reason, to embark on the lifeboats.
There were insidents in which the use of immersion suits inside totally enclosed lifeboats resulted overheating  and  dehydration of the users. 
IMO saggest that  immersion suits should not used inside totally enclosed lifeboats.

http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDat...22234/1278.pdf

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## Leo

Without comments a picture found in liflet from a Seamen Club "The mission to seafarers". The article refers to the Chinese crews and te steps are taking against the pirates...

DOC008.PDF

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## george123

Δηλαδή αν κατάλαβα καλά τους αντιμετωπίζουν με πυροσβεστήρες και αυτοσχέδιες βόμβες? Γιά περίγραψέ μου το.
 :Confused:

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